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Methane seeps are highly productive ecosystems that provide carbon sequestration services, host diverse communities including endemic species, and serve as habitats for commercial fisheries. Little is known about the economic value the public places on them. Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) are administered to a sample of Costa Rican taxpayers to evaluate their willingness to pay (WTP) in monetary terms using tradeoffs made in a survey context involving three of the main attributes of methane seep ecosystems to provide insights for future conservation and management efforts. Extensive effort is devoted to understanding how Costa Ricans view different aspects of the deep sea. We find that they associate it with strange animals, natural resources, the unknown, and being far from reach. Perhaps surprisingly, they underestimate how much they know about the deep sea. We find that WTP for methane seep protection is the highest for programs that protect seeps with endemic species, followed by seeps with high climate change mitigation potential and commercial fishing habitat. Higher-income groups and women are more likely to prefer options that increase the current level of protection. We discuss how science communication and community engagement contribute to care expressed toward the deep sea. 

Abstract The world has 1.4 billion passenger vehicles. How should governments regulate their air pollution emissions? A Pigouvian tax is technologically infeasible. Most countries instead rely on exhaust standards that limit air pollution emissions per mile for new vehicles. We assess the effectiveness and efficiency of these standards, which are the centerpiece of U.S. Clean Air Act regulation of transportation, and counterfactual policies. We show that the air pollution emissions per mile of new U.S. vehicles has fallen spectacularly, by over 99%, since standards began in 1967. Several research designs with a half century of data suggest that exhaust standards have caused most of this decline. Yet exhaust standards are not cost-effective in part because they fail to encourage scrap of older vehicles, which account for the majority of emissions. To study counterfactual policies, we develop an analytical and a quantitative model of the vehicle fleet. Analysis of these models suggests that tighter exhaust standards increase social welfare and increasing registration fees on dirty vehicles yields even larger gains by accelerating scrap, although both reforms have complex effects on inequality.